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THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT: CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
INTRODUCTION
The right to a speedy trial has long been a fundamental safe-
guard in common law criminal procedure.1 Secured by the sixth
amendment of the United States Constitution,2 this guarantee pro-
tects against undue and oppressive pretrial incarceration, reduces
the anxiety and suspicion that accompany untried accusations, and
limits the impairment of the defense resulting from lost witnesses
or faded memories.3 The right protects not only the interests of an
accused, but societal interests as well.4 Persons awaiting trial and
free on bail may commit other crimes; 5 those incarcerated in the
interim between arrest and trial often face deplorable jail condi-
tions, making attempts at rehabilitation most difficult.' Society
bears the financial burden "of supporting one in jail, and the indi-
vidual loses wages that might have been earned absent prolonged
delay.
Despite the importance of the speedy trial principle, few Su-
preme Court decisions have delineated its scope.' Not until 1972,
in Barker v. Wingo,8 did the Court first provide guidelines for de-
1. See, e.g., Md. Declaration of Rights art. XIX (1776); Pa. Declaration of Rights art.
IX (1776); Va. Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776). See also Magna Carta, ch. 29 (1225), re-
printed in COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE: LAWS OF ENGLAND 45 (5th ed.
1797); Assize of Clarendon (1166), reprinted in 2 ENGLISH ISTORMAL DocuMENTS 408
(1953).
2. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right to a speedy... trial ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
4. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
5. See generally Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Deten-
tion, 55 VA. L. Rxv. 1223, 1241-42 (1969).
6. See, e.g., Hearings on Federal Bail Procedures Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights and the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1946)(statement of James V. Bennett,
Bureau of Prisons).
7. The Supreme Court decisions dealing with this right, prior to Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514 (1972), include United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971); Dickey v. Florida, 398
U.S. 30 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354
(1957); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905).
8. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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termining whether a delay violates this right, establishing a balanc-
ing test that examines the interests and conduct of both the prose-
cution and the defendant. Relevant factors of the Barker test
include the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defen-
dant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant,
though none of these factors is "either a necessary or sufficient
condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right."9
While indicating that the length of permissible delay depends
upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case, the Court
refused to hold that the Constitution requires an individual to be
tried within a specified period. "[S]uch a result," according to Jus-
tice Powell, "would require the Court to engage in legislative or
rulemaking activity."10 The Court recognized that the gravity of a
delay is a function of the reasons underlying it. A purposeful delay
by the government intended to hinder the defense weighs heavily
against the government; unintended delays caused by overcrowded
courts or prosecutorial negligence are not weighed as heavily. Some
situations, such as the absence of a material witness, may com-
pletely justify delay.1 The Court stressed that a defendant is
responsible for asserting his right to a speedy trial, but rejected
implementation of the "demand-waiver doctrine," whereby a de-
fendant cannot obtain dismissal of his prosecution for want of a
speedy trial unless he previously demanded one and did not re-
ceive it. 1 2 Finally, a determination of whether a delay has been
prejudicial requires an evaluation of the defendant's interests
which the speedy trial right is designed to protect. Foremost
among these interests is a limitation on the potential impairment
of the accused's defense, because "the inability of a defendant ade-
quately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system."13
The speedy trial clause of the sixth amendment does not apply
to all delays in the criminal process. Only "a formal indictment or
information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and
holding to answer a criminal charge . . . engage [its] protec-
9. Id. at 530, 533.
10. Id. at 523.
11. Id. at 531.
12. Id. at 525-28.
13. Id. at 532.
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tions.' ' 14 The primary safeguards against oppressive preindictment
delay are provided by the applicable statutes of limitations.1 5
These statutes provide a time period beyond which there is an ir-
rebuttable presumption that any trial of the defendant would be
prejudicial. In United States v. Marion,"6 the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that the due process clause of the fifth amendment
also plays a limited role in protecting against prolonged delay, re-
quiring dismissal of an indictment only if it is shown that the pre-
indictment delay caused substantial prejudice to the defendant's
right to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to
gain a tactical advantage over the accused.17 This test is more
stringent than the Barker test for post indictment delay.'8 Barker
does not require an intent to delay; prosecution of a defendant
may be dismissed under the sixth amendment merely because of a
delay resulting from the government's negligence or carelessness.
The speedy trial right of one who violates a state statute at-
taches on the date of state "accusation." The pre-arrest delay pe-
riod is governed by the due process principles enunciated in
United States v. Marion.19 If a person violates a federal statute,
the right attaches on the date of federal arrest or indictment,
whichever is earlier. The Supreme Court has held that the prosecu-
tion of an individual by both the state and federal governments for
the same offense does not violate the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment.2 0 Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress, how-
ever, has considered whether the speedy trial right of one accused
of a federal crime could ever attach prior to the date of federal
arrest or indictment, when a state arrest based on the same illegal
activity has previously occurred with the acquiesence of the federal
14. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). For discussions of the proposi-
tion that the speedy trial right should apply to preindictment delays, see Steinberg, Right to
Speedy Trial: The Constitutional Right and its Applicability to the Speedy Trial Act of
1974, 66 J. CrM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 229 (1975); Note, Pre-Arrest Delay: Evolving Due Pro-
cess Standards, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 722 (1968); Note, The Right to Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L.
Rav. 476 (1968); Note, Justice Overdue-Speedy Trial for the Potential Defendant, 5 STAN.
L. Rav. 95 (1952); Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other Juris-
dictions, 77 YALE L. J. 767 (1968).
15. 404 U.S. at 322.
16. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
17. Id. at 324; United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1977).
18. See text accompanying notes 8-13 supra.
19. See text accompanying note ,16 supra.
20. See text accompanying notes 37-43 infra.
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government. It is unclear whether the appropriate date of attach-
ment of the speedy trial right in such circumstances is the date of
federal or state arrest. The resolution of this problem is currently
within the discretion of the individual circuit courts. One circuit
may apply the strict fifth amendment Marion test to the post-
state/pre-federal accusation period; another may apply the sixth
amendment speedy trial guarantee, resulting in a greater chance of
the prosecution's being barred for unacceptable delay. It is to the
accused's advantage, therefore, to have his sixth amendment right
to a speedy trial commence as early as possible. Since the time of
attachment of the right in multiple prosecution cases is undefined,
however, an individual might be arbitrarily subjected to further
prosecution because of a particular circuit's application of either
Barker or Marion.
I. THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974
Congress and the courts have become increasingly concerned
with problems arising from delayed disposition of cases. In 1972,
Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which pro-
vides that each district court "prepare a plan for the prompt dis-
position of criminal cases," became effective.21 A model plan sug-
gesting time limits between indictment and arraignment,
arraignment and trial, and conviction and sentencing was submit-
ted by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to
each district court.22 The courts had the option of either adopting
the model plan or preparing similar plans. The Rule, however, suf-
fered from the same defect that characterized Supreme Court deci-
sions regarding the denial of a right to a speedy trial: it provided
no uniform definition of the right. The goal of the model plan-to
limit delay in the circuits-was largely unrealized. 3
21. FED. R. CRiM. P. 50(b) (amended 1976). The amendment to Rule 50(b) takes into
account the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3151-3156, 3161-3174 (Supp. 1979).
22. The model plan, for example, suggested a 20-day and 30-day period, respectively, as
the maximum time between indictment and arraignment for defendants in custody or re-
leased. When Rule 50(b) was amended in 1976, the section setting out the necessary con-
tents of the district court plans for those districts electing not to adopt the model plan was
deleted. The interim plans of the Speedy Trial Act required different contents. 18 U.S.C. §
3166.
23. H.R. REP. No. 90, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CoNo. &
AD. NEWS 7401, 7406.
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In January 1975, Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act,24 one
purpose of which is to assist in reducing crime and the danger of
recidivism.2 5 The Act establishes time limits within which one ac-
cused of a federal crime must be indicted, arraigned and tried: an
information or indictment must be filed within thirty days of the
date on which the accused is arrested or served with a summons in
connection with the offense; an arraignment must be held within
ten days of the filing of the information or indictment; and the
trial must begin within sixty days of the arraignment.26
In computing the time limits, the Speedy Trial Act excludes
many periods of delay.27 The applicable sanction for violation of
the Act depends on the stage of the procedure in which the exces-
sive delay occurs. If it is between arrest and indictment, the
charges are automatically dropped;2 8 if between arraignment and
trial, the information or indictment is dismissed only on a defen-
dant's motion. If the defendant fails to move for dismissal prior to
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, he is deemed to have waived
his right.2 9
The Speedy Trial Act differs from the Supreme Court inter-
pretations of the sixth amendment right to speedy trial in several
respects. The Act specifies that a person must be brought to trial
within 100 days from arrest, while the cases fail to fix any time
limit. Under the Act, "no continuance ... shall be granted be-
cause of general congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of dili-
gent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the
part of the attorney for the Government."'' According to the
Barker test, however, delays resulting from negligence or over-
crowded court calendars should not be weighed as heavily against
the government. The two standards also differ regarding a defen-
dant's assertion of his speedy trial right: the Barker test considers
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3156, 3161-3174 (Supp. 1979).
25. See generally Steinberg, supra note 14.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (c), and (e).
27. Among the delays excluded in determining whether time limitations have been met
are delays resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant; delays resulting from
the absence or unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness, or delays resulting
from a continuance granted by any judge on the basis of findings that the ends of justice
served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a
speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a)(2).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3151(h)(8)(c).
1980]
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this assertion one factor in an ad hoc balancing approach; the
Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant assert his right only
when there has been delay between arraignment and trial, not be-
tween arrest and indictment. The last, and perhaps most impor-
tant, difference is that between the dismissals available under the
Speedy Trial Act and Supreme Court interpretations of the speedy
trial right. In Strunk v. United States,3 1 the Court held that the
sole remedy for deprivation of a speedy trial under the Constitu-
tion is dismissal with prejudice. Under the Act, however, dismissal
may be with or without prejudice. A dismissal with prejudice by a
federal judge bars a state from reprosecuting an individual on the
same charge, but a dismissal without prejudice does not have this
effect.3 2 The Act enumerates four factors a judge shall consider in
the dismissal determination: (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2)
the facts and circumstances of the case that led to the dismissal;
(3) the impact of reprosecution on the administration of the Act;
and (4) the impact of reprosecution on the administration of
justice.33
The Speedy Trial Act does not, of course, displace the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial. The Act recognizes that "[n]o
provision.., shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial
of a speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitu-
tion."3  In enacting this legislation, however, Congress failed to
confront the delay controversy accompanying cases of state-federal
prosecutions. 5 Section 3161(b) of the Act refers merely to the day
on which the individual was "arrested." There is no statutory defi-
nition of when an arrest begins for purposes of the Act. To date, no
31. 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
32. Permitting dismissal without prejudice has ndt gone without criticism. See e.g.,
Russ & Mandelhern, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: A Trap for the Unwary Practitioner, 2
J. CRIM. DEF. 1, 27-29 (1976); Steinberg, Dismissal With or Without Prejudice Under the
Speedy Trial Act: A Proposed Interpretation, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1-7 (1977);
Hansen & Reed, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 in Constitutional Perspective, 47 Miss. L. J.
365, 415-17 (1976).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3173. For further discussions of the Speedy Trial Act, see Steinberg,
supra note 33; Steinberg, supra note 14; Hansen & Reed; supra note 33; Soloman, Speedy
Trial Act: First Line of Defense, 14 TRIAL 66 (1978); Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974,
43 U. CH. L. REv. 667 (1976); Comment, Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Defining the Sixth
Amendment Right, 25 CATH. U. L. REv. 130 (1975); Comment, Speedy Trial Act of 1974: A
Suggestion, 8 CUM. L. REv. 905 (1978).
35. See text accompanying notes 59-90 infra.
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United States Court of Appeals has interpreted this "arrest" to in-
clude a state arrest, and some have specifically held that it in-
cludes only federal arrests.36
II. DUAL SOVEREIGNTY OR DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
An examination of the principle of dual sovereignty-its
meaning, its effects, and the criticism it has generated-facilitates
an understanding of the conflict among the circuits regarding the
date of attachment of the speedy trial right in cases of dual prose-
cution. In United States v. Lanza,8 7 the Supreme Court declared
that "an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sov-
ereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and
may be punished by each." 8 Bartkus v. Illinois"e and Abbate v.
United States40 reaffirmed this dual sovereignty principle, holding
that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment"1 does not
preclude either the federal or state government from prosecuting
an individual, even though he has already been prosecuted by the
other for the same illegal activity. Otherwise, according to Justice
Frankfurter, prosecution by federal authorities for minor federal
offenses would displace the reserved power of states over state of-
fenses.' 2 Similarly, federal law enforcement would be impaired if
state prosecutions barred federal action for the same acts.43
These decisions have been the subject of severe criticism by
jurists and commentators. Justice Black, dissenting in Bartkus, re-
sponded that the federalism arguments could be answered by con-
gressional legislation defining the crime to be punished and the
minimum penalties to be set in both state and federal courts or by
36. See, e.g., United States v. Lai Ming Tanu, 589 F.2d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Phillips, 569 F.2d 1315, 1317 (5th Cir. 1978).
37. 260 U.S. 377 (1922). The defendants were prosecuted in a federal district court for
violations of federal liquor laws after an information had been filed in a state court charging
them with state violations arising from the same activity.
38. Id. at 382.
39. 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (state prosecution permitted after prior federal prosecution for
the same conduct).
40. 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (federal prosecution permitted after prior state prosecution for
same conduct).
41. The fifth amendment provides, in part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeop.rdy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
42. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. at 137; Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. at 195.
43. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. at 137.
1980]
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prohibiting the states from acting altogether." He stressed that
the objectives of the double jeopardy clause are thwarted by multi-
ple prosecutions:
If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two "Sovereigns"
to inflict it than for one. If danger to the innocent is emphasized, that danger
is surely no less when the power of State and Federal Governments is
brought to bear on one man in two trials, than when one of these "Sover-
eigns" proceeds alone."
Several commentators argue that permitting reprosecution by
different levels of government contradicts the common law founda-
tions of the double jeopardy clause. 4" The policy of permitting
multiple prosecutions is inconsistent with the international law
principle that a plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict bars
the prosecution of an individual in one country if he has been tried
in another for the same offense.47 Furthermore, the policy does not
comport with international covenants on human rights."
44. 359 U.S. at 157 (Black, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 155 (Black, J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REv.
1309 (1932); Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation: Common Law and Brit-
ish Empire Comparisons, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1956).
47. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820).
48. On October 5, 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967). These treaties were submitted to
the Senate on February 23, 1978, together with a letter recommending a series of reserva-
tions and understandings. The United States government has yet to ratify these human
rights covenants.
Article 14 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant states: "No one shall be liable to be
tried or punished again for an offense for which he has already been finally convicted or
acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country." Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra art. 14, para. 7. President Carter's letter to the Senate
recommended an "understanding" to this paragraph,
that the prohibition on double jeopardy contained in paragraph (7) is applicable
only when the judgment of acquittal has been rendered by a court of the same
government unit, whether the Federal Government or a constituent unit, which
is seeking a new trial for the same cause.
President's Human Rights Treaty Message to the Senate, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc.
395 (Feb. 23, 1978), reprinted in Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights Message from
the President of the United States, 05th Cong., 2d Sess. at XIII (1978).
For an excellent analysis of the human rights covenants and their relationship to the
double jeopardy clause, see Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights
Covenants, 63 MINN. L. Rnv. 35 (1978).
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The Justice Department recognized the potential harshness of
the Bartkus-Abbate rule, and in April 1959 then Attorney General
William Rogers announced a policy of limited state-federal
prosecution.
After a state prosecution, there should be no federal trial for the same
act or acts unless the reasons are compelling.
We should continue to make every effort to cooperate with state and lo-
cal authorities to the end that the trial occur in the jurisdiction, whether it be
state or Federal, where the public interest is best served. If this be deter-
mined accurately, and is followed by efficient and intelligent cooperation by
state and Federal law enforcement authorities, the consideration of a second
prosecution very seldom should arise.49
According to this policy, United States Attorneys must submit
a recommendation to an Assistant Attorney General for permission
to proceed with a federal trial when a state trial based on the same
incident has already begun. The recommendation may not be ap-
proved without prior notice to the Attorney General. The policy,
denominated the Petite policy by the courts,50 grants the executive
branch of the government the discretion to permit federal prosecu-
tion. Conflicts have arisen with the judiciary concerning abuse of
this discretion.51 Courts have recognized the harm to defendants
49. Statement of Attorney General William P. Rogers, New York Times, Apr. 6, 1959,
at 1, col. 4; id. at 19, cols. 1-2.
50. The name is derived from Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), the first
Supreme Court decision to vacate a conviction at the request of the Justice Department. In
Petite, the prior conviction was a federal, not a state, conviction arising out of the same
transaction. The Solicitor General, however, said the case was closely related to the policy
against successive state-federal prosecutions announced by the Justice Department in 1959.
51. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (per curiam); Watts v. United
States, 422 U.S. 1032 (1975). In Watts, a defendant was acquitted in a state court of charges
of aggravated assault with intent to rob, and carrying a concealed weapon. Thereafter, he
was convicted in a federal court of a charge arising out of the same incident and involving
the same weapon, United States v. Watts, 505 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court
vacated his conviction on a motion by the Solicitor General that the Justice Department
had violated the Petite policy. In Rinaldi, the Court again vacated a federal conviction,
holding that the district court had abused its discretion by denying the government's mo-
tion to dismiss an indictment pursuant to the Petite policy. The defendant had been suc-
cessfully prosecuted for robbery under state law. He was subsequently convicted of the same
offense under federal law. While the federal conviction was being appealed, the government
moved to dismiss the indictment. The district court denied the government's motion on the
ground that the government had acted in bad faith, since an official of the Justice Depart-
ment had originally authorized the fe'deral prosecution knowing that it was in contravention
of the Petite policy. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction, reasoning that a "defen-
dant should receive the benefit of the policy whenever its application is urged by the Gov-
ernment." 434 U.S. at 31.
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resulting from multiple prosecution52 and their decisions reflect the
erosion of the successive state-federal prosecution policy.
The Supreme Court has examined the application of the
double jeopardy clause in other contexts. The decisions illustrate
diminishing support for the dual sovereignty theory and broader
use of the ban on double jeopardy. The double jeopardy clause has
been held applicable to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment,58 and it bars prosecution and pun-
ishment of an individual for a greater offense after a court has al-
ready prosecuted him for a lesser offense based on the same activ-
ity." The Court qualified the dual sovereignty theory in Elkins v.
United States,55 overturning the "silver platter" doctrine, which
permitted use of evidence illegally obtained by state officials in a
federal criminal prosecution, even though the evidence would have
been inadmissible if seized by federal authorities. Justice Stewart
focused on the rights of the defendant, rather than the concept of
federalism: "To the victim it matters not whether his constitu-
tional right has been invaded by a federal agent or by a state of-
ficer."' 56 Dual sovereignty was further undermined in Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm.,57 when the Court declared that a state may
not force a witness to give testimony that might later be used
against him in a federal trial. In Waller v. Florida,8 the Court re-
fused to extend the dual sovereignty theory to successive prosecu-
tions by municipal and state authorities.
The harshness of the dual sovereignty theory is magnified
when one considers the complexities involved in claims of a denial
of the right to a speedy trial. Assuming it is proper to allow prose-
cution by both the state and federal governments for the same of-
fense, the focus shifts: when does the speedy trial right of the indi-
vidual in the federal court attach? Should a court completely
ignore the post-state, pre-federal indictment period in its applica-
tion of the Barker test? One may argue that attaching the sixth
amendment speedy trial right on the date of prior state arrest
52. See note 51 supra.
53. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937).
54. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
55. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
56. Id. at 215 (footnote omitted).
57. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
58. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
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would interfere with federal jurisdiction by forcing immediate fed-
eral indictments and trials of state arrestees, with resultant over-
crowding of federal court calendars. Others may assert that the in-
equities resulting from the uncertain application of the sixth
amendment speedy trial or the fifth amendment due process rights
dictate rejection of the dual sovereignty doctrine. At the very least,
it may be argued, a court should recognize that the abuses result-
ing from prolonged delay occur whether the prior arrest was by
state or federal authorities, thus suggesting a broader application
of the sixth amendment right. Before considering the merits of ap-
plying either the sixth or the fifth amendment to pre-federal in-
dictment delay, however, it is necessary to examine the approaches
taken by circuit courts in multiple prosecution cases.
III. CRcuIT COURT APPROACHES
There is no well-defined policy among the circuit courts re-
garding the time of attachment of the speedy trial right in dual
sovereignty cases. In United States v. DeTienne,5 9 the Seventh
Circuit held that the sixth amendment speedy trial right begins
once the government accuses, not could have accused, the defen-
dant. DeTienne had been convicted of theft, forgery, and conspir-
acy in an Illinois state court in March, 1968. Following forfeiture of
his appeal bond, he was arrested by the F.B.I. on October 3, 1968
on a federal unlawful flight warrant. A state arrest warrant was
served the following day, and the federal warrant was subsequently
dismissed. On December 5, 1969, a federal indictment was handed
down charging the defendant with a September, 1968 attempted
bank robbery, and assault with a dangerous weapon. The defen-
dant argued that the delay for sixth amendment purposes should
be measured from the date of his October, 1968 arrest. He alleged,
and the government agreed, that most of the investigative activity
by the F.B.I. was completed by November, 1968. Interpreting
United States v. Marion,60 the court maintained that
[i]t would be absurd in the extreme if an arrest on one charge triggered the
Sixth Amendment's speedy trial protection as to prosecutions for any other
chargeable offenses. Of course, if the crimes for which a defendant is ulti-
mately prosecuted really only gild the charge underlying his initial arrest and
59. 468 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911 (1973).
60. 404 U.S. 307 (1971). See also text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
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the different accusatorial dates between them are not reasonably explicable,
the initial arrest may well mark the speedy trial provision's applicability as to
prosecution for all the interrelated offenses.8 1
In United States v. Cabral,62 the First Circuit liberally con-
strued the commencement date of the speedy trial guarantee.
While investigating reports that parts of stolen automobiles were
being sold at the defendant's cabin, two Maine undercover police
officers visited the site purportedly to make a purchase. Before the
defendant showed the officers the goods, he displayed a sawed-off
shotgun. A brief struggle ensued, and the defendant was arrested
for possession of the weapon. The officers checked the engine num-
ber of a suspicious vehicle, and then placed Cabral under arrest for
possession of stolen property. Three days later, the shotgun was
turned over to federal authorities. The defendant was arraigned in
state court on a charge of grand larceny, but this charge was subse-
quently dismissed. Fifteen months after the arrest by state officers,
a federal indictment was issued against the defendant for posses-
sion of the weapon. The First Circuit held that the government's
prosecution of the weapons charge was initiated when, shortly fol-
lowing state arrest, the federal authorities received the weapon.60
The defendant's right to a speedy trial crystallized at this point
because the basis of arrest for both the federal and state offenses
was identical. The court applied the Barker balancing test to this
pre-federal indictment period. Since the defendant failed to
demonstrate actual prejudice from the delay, his conviction was
affirmed.
Just what is meant by "basis of arrest" continues to confuse
the courts. The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of this notion, for ex-
ample, is a strict one: the court will toll the delay period from an
earlier date only when the prior arrest is based on the same illegal
activity as the present indictment and is for violation of a federal
statute. If the initial arrest is solely for violation of a state statute,
the speedy trial guarantee will not commence until federal indict-
ment, even if the state arrest was based on the same activity as the
federal indictment. Thus, in Gravitt v. United States," the speedy
trial guarantee ran from the point of federal, not prior state, arrest
61. 468 F.2d at 155.
62. 475 F.2d 715 (1st Cir. 1973).
63. Id. at 718.
64. 523 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1975).
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because the initial charges for which the defendant was arrested
stemmed from violations of Georgia state law.6 5 Furthermore, the
court refused to apply Barker's ad hoc balancing test, even though
the period following federal arrest fell within the scope of speedy
trial protection. Instead, the court applied a unique post-arrest,
pre-indictment delay test in which a defendant must demonstrate
substantial actual prejudice, but need not show intent to
prejudice.66 This hybrid of the Barker and Marion approaches was
rejected by the Supreme Court in United States v. Dillingham.
6 7
In determining whether the Constitution mandates dismissal of a
delayed criminal proceeding, therefore, a district court is to apply
one of two tests-the Marion test prior to an arrest, or the Barker
test subsequent to an arrest. The threshold question that remains
unanswered is what constitutes an arrest. This question must be
confronted in multiple prosecution cases whether a defendant as-
serts the right as constitutional or statutory. Judge Goldberg, writ-
65. Id. at 1213.
66. Id. at 1215. The court relied upon United States v. Palmer, 502 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir.
1974) and United States v. Zane, 489 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959
(1974), where the Fifth Circuit held that post-arrest, pre-indictment delay falls within the
scope of the speedy trial guarantee but requires a showing of actual prejudice to warrant
dismissal. Gravitt recognized that nonapplication of the Barker balancing test in this situa-
tion appears inconsistent with the teachings of the Supreme Court in United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). Nevertheless, the court felt compelled to follow its prior case
law until further Supreme Court pronouncements on the subject. 523 F.2d at 1215 n.7.
67. 423 U.S. 64 (1975)(per curiam). In post-Dillingham decisions, the Fifth Circuit
clearly abandonded the hybrid Barker-Marion test. The court continued, however, to re-
quire federal accusation before recognizing any sixth amendment speedy trial rights of a
defendant. In United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063
(1978), a defendant was arrested for possession of cocaine in violation of state law. The state
court judge suppressed the seized evidence, and the prosecution nolle prossed the state
charges. More than twenty months after the initial arrest, a federal indictment was handed
down, charging the defendant with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The court
held that the defendant was not denied his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial by
reason of the pre-indictment delay, since the right did not attach until the time of the fed-
eral indictment. No due process violation was proved, and the conviction of the defendant
was affirmed.
In United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1976),
the Fifth Circuit measured the delay period for speedy trial purposes from the date of the
prior arrest, but that arrest was by federal authorities in another district. The defendants
were first arrested for conspiring to Violate federal narcotics laws under an arrest warrant
issued in the District of Columbia. Their arrest warrants were subsequently dismissed and,
approximately one year later, the defendants were indicted along with six others in the
Southern District of Florida on charges arising from the conspiracy for which they had pre-
viously been arrested. Since both arrests arose out of the same activity and involved the
same federal statute, broader application of the speedy trial right was permitted.
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ing for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Avalos, 8 recognized
the difficulty in any attempt to define the speedy trial right:
In our contemporary world, we measure the speed of light and sound by
mathematical formulae. But the more mundane concept of speedy trial is not
susceptible to formula or table. It is, rather, a composite of objective and
subjective factors that defies the mathematicians and confounds the philoso-
phers-hence the necessity of the tome of doubts, resolved, we trust, as the
law commands and fairness dictates."
In United States v. Phillips,7 0 the Fifth Circuit held that a
state arrest did not trigger the time limits of the Plan for the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for
Achieving Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases. When the defen-
dant was arrested, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 was not in effect.
In compliance with the phase-in provisions of the Act, however,
the Southern District of Texas, like district courts throughout the
country, adopted an interim plan that provided time limits within
which those arrested must be indicted, arraigned and tried. The
court interpreted the "arrest" under this plan to mean only federal
arrest, and concluded that a contrary view would congest court cal-
endars and thwart the goals of the Speedy Trial Act.7'
The Second Circuit reached a similar result in United States
v. Mejias.72 Mejias involved a joint federal-state investigation of
illegal narcotics activity. The arrest and indictment were initially
made by the state with the approval of the federal government.
The state court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the ev-
idence, but seventeen months later, a federal indictment was is-
sued. The court rejected the date of state arrest as the arrest
within the meaning of the Southern District Speedy Trial Plan. 8
Mejias, however, involved a statutory rather than a constitu-
tional claim of a denial of a speedy trial. The Second Circuit has
not resolved the issue of whether the constitutional right to a
speedy trial in a federal court could ever attach at the time of prior
68. 541 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1976). For a discussion of this
case, see note 67 supra.
69. 541 F.2d at 1104.
70. 569 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978).
71. Id. at 1317.
72. 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Padilla-Martinez v. United States,
434 U.S. 847 (1977).
73. 552 F.2d at 442.
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state arrest. An analysis of United States v. Lai Ming Tanu,74 a
recent Second Circuit opinion, illustrates the court's dissatisfaction
with the current speedy trial aspects of the dual sovereignty the-
ory. Lai Ming Tanu consisted of a "concatenation of events that
border[ed] on the bizarre." 75 Mrs. Tanu and others were arrested
by a joint federal-state task force of agents of the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) and the New York City Police De-
partment on May 30, 1974, for allegedly conspiring to sell heroin to
undercover police officers. At the time of the arrest, the federal
government had all the evidence necessary to initiate prosecu-
tion.76 The task force, however, decided to prosecute the defen-
dants in state court because of more severe statutory penalties. On
June 21, 1974, the defendants were indicted by a New York
County Grand Jury on three felony counts. The two defendants
who had actually made the sale pleaded guilty on February 3,
1976. Mrs. Tanu appeared sixty-four times before the state su-
preme court and repeatedly requested a speedy trial. In Septem-
ber, 1976, the court dismissed the twenty-seven month old indict-
ment against Mrs. Tanu because she was denied her right to a
speedy trial under the sixth amendment and under New York
Criminal Procedure Law § 30.20.7 The state special narcotics pros-
ecutor did not appeal.
Although the DEA agent acting as liason on the case knew of
the decision not to appeal, he took no action at the time. Later
events brought the matter to his attention again, and it was re-
ferred to the United States Attorney's Office, which opened a file
on Mrs. Tanu in November, 1977. In accordance with the Petite
policy,7 8 the government received permission to prosecute from the
Department of Justice. On May 15, 1978, Mrs. Tanu was indicted
by a federal grand jury for the same transaction that was the sub-
ject of the state indictment. The district court initially held that
there was neither a fifth amendment due process nor a sixth
amendment speedy trial ground for dismissing the indictment.
74. 589 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1978).
75. Id. at 90.
76. Money furnished by agents of the United States government was used to purchase
the heroin. After the heroin was confiscated, it was placed in the custody of the DEA, not
the city police. At all times, the federal government had been part of the investigation.
77. The statute provides: "After a criminal action is commenced, the defendant is enti-
tled to a speedy trial." N.Y. CraM. PROc. LAw § 30.20 (McKinney 1971).
78. See text accompanying notei 49-52 supra.
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Following two mistrials for failure to reach a verdict, the dis-
trict court dismissed the indictment, basing its decision on the
sixth amendment, the eighth amendment,1 9 the inherent power of
the court to control its own procedures under Article III of the
Constitution, the policy of the United States as reflected in Rule
50(b) of the Criminal Procedure Law,80 and the Southern District
Plan for the Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases as promulgated
under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.81 The Second Circuit reversed,
declaring that a district court judge does not have the power to
dismiss an indictment simply because he believes it to be in the
interests of justice.82
Judge Gurfein, writing for the Court of Appeals, analogized
Lai Ming Tanu to Mejias.8e While recognizing the factual distinc-
tions between the two cases,8 he failed to give their differences
much weight. The court held that for purposes of the Speedy Trial
Act, a defendant in federal court does not become an "accused"
79. Judge Weinstein mentioned the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment as a possible basis for dismissal. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
80. See notes 21-22 supra & accompanying text.
81. SECOND Cmcurr REDBOOK 244 (1977). This action was taken in accordance with 18
U.S.C. § 3164.
82. FAD. R. Cium. P. 48(b) provides: "If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the
charge to a grand jury or in filing an information against the defendant who has been held
to answer to the district court, or if there is an unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to
trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint." However, the dis-
trict court does not have the power to dismiss a legally sufficient indictment merely because
it deems dismissal to be in the interests of justice. See Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241
(1932); United States v. Dooling, 406 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 911 (1969).
An indictment should not be dismissed under rule 48(b) on the basis of a denial of a speedy
trial unless there has been deliberate or oppressive action by law enforcement officials. See
Hunt v. United States, 456 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1972).
In reversing the district court decision in Lai Ming Tanu, Judge Gurfein warned: "In our
system of imperfect justice there is, at times, a temptation to do what we think is more
perfect justice." 589 F.2d at 90.
83. See notes 72-73 supra & accompanying text.
84. In Lai Ming Tanu, the contraband evidence was taken by agents of the federal
government at the time of the state arrest. In Mejias, the federal government did not re-
ceive the evidence from the state until one year after the state arrests, and five months
before the federal indictment. The basis of the federal indictment in Lai Ming Tanu was
possession of narcotics on the same !lay as charged in the state, indictment, by the single
remaining unconvicted defendant in the state proceeding. In'Mejias, the government con-
ducted a fresh investigation, procured new evidence and added some co-conspirators. Fi-
nally, the federal authorities in Lai Ming Tanu did not decide to prosecute until one and
one-half years after there was an actual dismissal of the state indictment for failure to af-
ford the appellee her sixth amendment rights. The federal court in Mejias heard the case
promptly after the defendant's suppression motion was granted.
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until he is under federal arrest. Since the district court judge ini-
tially found no prejudice from the delay in federal prosecution, 5
the court left open the question whether the sixth amendment
speedy trial guarantee could ever be invoked before federal
indictment.
Judge Oakes, reluctantly concurring, agreed that this was a
"very close case," 8  but decided that the trial court's dismissal of
the indictment was improper. He also contended that 'the period
for calculating length of delay should begin at the point the federal
prosecutor should reasonably have initiated his own effort. 8 7 He
stated that federal proceedings in Lai Ming Tanu should reason-
ably have been initiated about two months after the state indict-
ment was dismissed. State and federal authorities cooperated
throughout the investigation, and the federal government should
have been aware of the state court developments. Under this ap-
proach, the delay period of the Barker test is not limited simply
because federal prosecution commences some time after the state
arrest. Nor would there be a requirement of immediate federal ac-
tivity at the earlier arrest date. Rather, a court would look at the
totality of the circumstances. The speedy trial right would not at-
tach simply at the date of state arrest or the date of federal indict-
ment. The significance of this approach is its recognition that the
right may attach before federal accusation.
The Ninth Circuit applies a more rigid standard. In United
States v. Cordova,8 8 the court held that the sixth amendment
speedy trial right is not activated until federal accusation. The de-
fendant was arrested by state officers for possession of heroin; the
state action was dismissed before trial for failure to comply with
the state's speedy trial rule. Cordova was indicted under federal
law fourteen months later for the same activity that led to the
state arrest. The court refused to allow Cordova to "benefit from
[this] coincidence,"89 and applied the stricter Marion test to the
85. After the jury in the first trial retired for deliberation, Judge Weinstein stated that
he did not think the delay in prosecution inconvenienced the defendant or led to the loss of
any evidence or made it more difficult for the defendant to try the case. This position was
inconsistent with his subsequent dismissal of the indictment on sixth amendment grounds,
because the Barker test requires a finding of prejudice.
86. 589 F.2d at 92.
87. Id. at 91.
88. 537 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976).
89. 537 F.2d at 1076.
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pre-federal indictment delay. Although there were separate "accu-
sations" by the state and federal governments, both accusations
were based on the defendant's illegal possession of heroin. Like-
wise, in United States v. Cabral,90 there were separate accusations,
but at least one basis of the state arrest was similar to that of the
federal indictment. There, the court applied the speedy trial guar-
antee from the time of the earlier arrest."1 Although Cabral seems
to support a conclusion contrary to Cordova, the Ninth Circuit
used that decision to support its holding. The court was eager to
apply an inflexible test.to a right not readily definable.
CONCLUSION
In American jurisprudence, it is undisputed that an individual
has a right to a speedy trial. In Barker v. Wingo,9 2 the Supreme
Court established a test for ascertaining whether a defendant has
been denied this right. A major element of the test is "prejudice to
the defendant": an indictment will not be dismissed on constitu-
tional grounds unless the defendant has suffered loss of the very
interests that the guarantee is designed to protect.93 But one can-
not resolve the prejudice issue until the period of delay is clearly
defined. Unfortunately, there is no consistent policy among the cir-
cuits regarding the attachment date of the speedy trial right when
there are multiple prosecutions. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 ig-
nores this problem, and the Supreme Court has failed to confront
the issue.
Considering the already recognized harshness of multiple pros-
ecutions, the Barker test should be applicable to pre-indictment
delays in circumstances such as those confronted by the court in
United States. v. Lai Ming Tanu." The harm to a defendant is no
less for post-state arrest, pre-federal indictment delay than it is for
post-federal indictment delay. Thus, if the sixth amendment is to
protect against oppressive incarceration, unnecessary anxiety, and
90. 475 F.2d 715 (1st Cir. 1973).
91. See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra.
92. 407 U.S. 514 (1972); see text accompanying notes 8-13 supra.
93. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
94. 589 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1978); see notes 74-87 supra and accompanying text.
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impairment of the defense of an accused in a post-state arrest pe-
riod, the speedy trial right must attach before federal indictment.
DENNIS P. KOEPPEL

